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The IDS–DFID Learning Hub aims to improve
knowledge and information flows between DFID
practitioners and experts in the field of low carbon
climate resilient development. It is a new approach
that combines practitioner learning networks,
knowledge management capacity and reflective
learning processes with bespoke research and analysis.
The Hub has four interconnected ‘learning cycles’
(Approaches to planning for climate change; tackling
poverty in a changing climate; low carbon growth and
development; and difficult environments). Each cycle
hosts a learning event which are safe, supported
spaces for DFID staff who work on climate change and
development to share individual learning and skills;
engage experts in dialogue; develop new ways of
thinking and working together; identify where there are
knowledge and learning gaps and contribute to the co-
creation of a common knowledge base around ‘low
carbon climate resilient development’. All the learning
cycles are linked through various inputs and outputs
that create an ongoing flow of knowledge and will lead
to the development of theories of change for Low
Carbon Climate Resilient Development. 
This is the second Bridging Paper from the Hub’s second
learning cycle; tackling poverty in a changing climate.
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Introduction
The Learning Hub is a transformative way of
learning and sharing, bridging academic
knowledge with invaluable insights from
frontline practical experience. The Hub’s second
learning cycle focused on perhaps the
overarching challenge at the heart of climate
change and development. How do we ensure
that we tackle poverty and its root causes in
ways that are adaptive and low-carbon? The two
main ways that were used to explore this
question were a) the framing paper and b) the
learning event, held in Addis Ababa in March
2011. The purpose of this paper is to bridge the
thinking and learning that came out of the
framing paper and the debates sparked by it at
the learning event. 
The framing paper 
The background paper for the learning cycle
explored how livelihood changes happening
autonomously across the global south – in
response to multiple drivers – can lead to
pathways of poverty reduction or reproduction
(cf. Rigg, 2006). This linked very clearly to
learning cycle one, ‘Approaches to planning for
climate change’ where engaging with
autonomous adaptation to climate change was
recognised as a central part of the planning
process – with planning playing a key role in
creating an enabling environment to support
autonomous adaptation. Whilst this is a critical
insight, the framing paper for learning cycle 
two sought to look not just at autonomous
adaptation to climate change, but also at
broader processes of autonomous change and
their implications for poverty reduction. 
The analytical focus did not, and could not,
cover the whole of tackling poverty in a
changing climate. It centred on livelihood
vulnerability, exploring four broad processes
already happening autonomously but which do
not currently receive enough attention in the
climate arena: 
1 deagrarianisation (a long-term shift
away from rural agricultural
livelihoods) 
2 migration 
3 urbanisation
4 inequitable patterns of economic
growth. 
The paper sought to understand both the
consequences of processes of autonomous
change, and to tease out how different groups
of people (by ethnicity, age or gender, for
instance) experienced autonomous change in
different ways. For some, processes such as
migration or urbanisation could lead to poverty
reduction, whilst for others such processes were
as likely to reproduce poverty and to expose
them to new risks and vulnerabilities. It is
critical then, to ensure that climate change
interventions contribute to reinforcing the
pathways of poverty reduction, and to helping
people get out of or avoid pathways of poverty
reproduction, including those that stem from
changes in how people make a living.
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The learning event
Participants in the Tackling Poverty in a
Changing Climate learning event broadly
embraced the importance of processes of
autonomous change, much as had been
acknowledged in the previous learning cycle.
Yet they also underlined that these
considerations have to be linked to a wider
framework for tackling poverty in a changing
climate. Participants were keen to explore the
practical implications of engaging with
autonomous change, or in other words, how
this engagement would help in concrete terms
with tackling poverty in a changing climate.
A central concern emerged around the role and
benefit of sectoral and systems-based
approaches. In particular, participants
expressed a concern that whilst sectoral
approaches – such as working out the impacts
of climate change on agriculture or water –
were perceived to receive significant attention,
in reality they were not sufficiently covered. In
response it was proposed that a systems
perspective – which locates specific sectors
within an understanding of broader social-
ecological systems – was necessary for
effective action to tackle poverty in a changing
climate (a theme that had also featured
prominently in the first learning cycle). On a
more practical level two key debates emerged
through the learning event; differentiating
between ‘good’ development and adaptation,
and the need to put poverty at the heart of
climate change programming. 
The learning event dialogue focussed on:
n Understanding how climate
impacts on different groups and
systems / sectors
n Differentiating between
development and adaptation
n Putting poverty at the heart of
climate change responses
n Ensuring the needs of the poorest
and most vulnerable to climate
change are voiced and reflected 
in interventions from the local to
the global
The results of bringing together the framing
paper and the discussions from the learning
event are in many ways encapsulated in the ten
dimensions of tackling poverty in a changing
climate (see box one on following page and
section 5). But core issues from the learning
event are pulled out and explored in more
detail throughout the paper.
The paper is divided into four further sections.
Section 2 explores the social vulnerability
framing of climate change as developed in the
background paper. The following two sections
engage with the two key debates that
participants centred on during the learning
event. Section 3 considers the relationship
between adaptation and development, whilst
Section 4 explores issues around putting
poverty at the heart of the climate change
response. In Section 5, the paper draws
together ten critical dimensions for tackling
poverty in a changing climate that emerged
through the learning cycle process. 
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“Greater attention needs to be paid
to strategies that strengthen the
resilience and adaptive capacity of
societies as a whole”
Hedger et al., 2011:26
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Box 1: Ten critical dimensions of tackling poverty in a 
hanging climate
Be pro-active in ensuring that poverty issues are centre-
stage in the global climate change debates
Build resilience in developing countries (not carbon-
intensive development)
Explore how to square the relationship between poverty
reduction, a low-carbon future and economic growth 
Strengthen governance for reducing poverty and
vulnerability to climate change impacts
Engage with the private sector 
Link the ‘bigger picture’ with the local level
Ask how poor people are empowered by efforts to tackle
poverty in a changing climate
Embrace autonomous change
Strike the balance between sector and system 
Construct a strong, persuasive narrative on climate change
adaptation to push internally and externally
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Section digest...
Vulnerability is not simply a matter of
exposure to a specific hazard (climate-
related or otherwise). We’ve got to look
at the broader structural factors that
affect people’s assets, entitlements and
capabilities to respond to that hazard. 
Disaggregating ‘the poor’ according to
factors such as gender, age, ethnicity,
location (rural or urban), and according
to exposure to climate change impacts
will help us grasp the multi-dimensional
approach needed to understand any
relationship between poverty and 
climate change. 
There is a need for more equitable forms
of economic growth and complementary
approaches to reducing poverty. If these
can be made to address the underlying
causes which keep many in poverty they
are likely also to reduce vulnerability to
climate change impacts.
Applying a vulnerability
framing to tackling poverty
in a changing climate 
Vulnerability, poverty
and climate change 
Much of what we already know about tackling
poverty is still relevant in the context of a
changing climate. Here we flag in particular the
concept of vulnerability: it was coined long
before its use in the climate change arena, but is
now one of the key analytical tools for dealing
with climate change impacts. 
It is critical to disaggregate, or separate out,
when discussing ‘the poor’ or ‘the vulnerable’,
principally because neither poverty nor
vulnerability is a single, uni-dimensional
experience distributed evenly across age,
gender, ethnicity, class, location or other
factors. Taking a disaggregated approach
improves understanding of how climate
impacts are experienced in different ways
across these groups. Box two provides a
snapshot of how climate impacts different
groups in different ways.
2
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However it is important to recognise there is no
complete overlap between poverty and
vulnerability to climate change; vulnerability to
climate change does not always equal
vulnerability to poverty. Evidence suggests some
poor people are less vulnerable to climate
change impacts than others who are relatively
better off (Eakin, 2005 , Ziervogel et al., 2006).
‘Poor’ people may be less exposed to climate
impacts, more able to move and have knowledge
that can give them considerable adaptive
capacity in the face of climate impacts (Folke
2004; Salick and Ross 2009). So, when we
attempt to reduce vulnerability to climate change
impacts, it may have unintended consequences
– actually leaving poverty untouched or even
exacerbating it (Adger et al., 2005). 
Although being poor does not automatically
mean heightened vulnerability to climate change
impacts, vulnerability to poverty and climate
change frequently share the same root cause;
the (in)ability to withstand a multiplicity of
shocks and stresses. Ability to withstand shocks
and stresses is not just a result of different
levels of income – it can be explained more fully
with recourse to access to assets, entitlements
and capabilities (Sen, 1999). Access to
productive assets such as land, transport or
tools is clearly important. However, the assets,
entitlements and capabilities framework also
brings access to social networks, human rights,
health and education into the analysis thus
revealing the multi-dimensional causes of
poverty and vulnerability.
Box 2: A snapshot of socially differentiated climate impact
Gender:Women Watch (2009) argues that both women and men are vulnerable to climate
change impacts but in different ways and that for this reason gender-sensitive climate policies
must be followed.
Age: Literature on children’s relative vulnerability to extreme events points towards higher
mortality and morbidity rates among children for climate stresses and extreme events (Bartlett,
2008), with research in the USA finding considerable differences across age groups for
different types of hazard (Zahran et al., 2008).
Temporal: Some people are usually or always – chronically – poor, whilst others might be
cyclically poor and others again might only occasionally dip beneath the poverty line (Hulme
and Shepherd, 2003). Tanner and Mitchell (2008) point the way forward in this regard by
matching up different adaptation options for people at different points on the ‘poverty
continuum’.
Spatial: Urban and rural populations experience climate impacts differently and this must
likewise guide adaptation and mitigation. Poverty reduction initiatives designed with rural
populations in mind cannot be assumed to work for urban populations and vice versa.
However the inter-linkages between the two must not be overlooked, for example lower
agricultural productivity impacting food availability in urban markets; migration of rural
citizens to cities seeking income opportunities to remit money back to families.
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10 Vulnerability is not simply a matter of exposure
to a specific hazard (climate-related or
otherwise). It also relates to the broader
structural factors which affect the assets,
entitlements and capabilities available to
people to respond to that hazard. A focus on
disaggregation – of ‘the poor’ according to
gender, age, ethnicity, location (rural or urban),
and according to exposure to climate change
impacts – leads to a multi-dimensional
approach to understanding any relationship
between poverty and climate change. Indeed,
unless we ensure that we understand the
differentiated impacts of climate change across
different types and degrees of poverty, it will be
hard to know whether intervention reaches the
poorest, and how well it works for different
groups. These responses have to engage with
changes that are happening autonomously –
such as deagrarianisation, increasing
inequality, increasing informal settlement in
urban spaces. These processes may offer the
prospect of poverty reduction for some even as
they threaten to consign hundreds of millions
to entrenched poverty.
“the ability to shift strategies depends...on the ability to access flows of knowledge,
information, people, goods, services, finance and social support. When populations
lack access to such flows, they face fundamental constraints in their ability to shift
strategies and are, as a result, confined to more basic coping and survival,” 
Hedger et al., 2011:26
Figure 1 Pathways of Poverty
Assets
entitlements
capabilities
Vulnerability space
Poverty
reproduction
Poverty
reduction
Opportunities &
interventions
ethnicity class
age
location
Shocks &
stresses
gender
Figure one illustrates how pathways of poverty
can, in the context of autonomous change, lead
either to poverty being reduced or reproduced.
At the outset it recognises the influence of the
assets, capabilities and entitlements that people
use as the basis for making a living; the arrows
represent pathways which can lead either
towards poverty reduction or poverty
reproduction but where these pathways lead is
mediated by the factors balanced in the
‘vulnerability space’. Into this space intercede
not only shocks and stresses (climatic and
others) but also opportunities and interventions. 
In learning cycle one two broad approaches –
which are mutually reinforcing – are identified
for responding to the adaptation challenges
associated with climate change:
Developing specific strategies for
responding or adapting to specific
projected impacts, and
Building the resilience and adaptive
capacity of society as a whole to
create the enabling environment
necessary for adaption to occur
From a poverty reduction perspective specific
planned interventions to reduce vulnerability to
the changing climate (adaptation) – such as
introducing drought resistant crops or
installing adequate storm drains – are
recognised as necessary yet it is considered
that these cannot substitute for broader
structural change that can enhance 
adaptive capacity. 
At the same time we cannot shy away from the
extent to which the most central plank in
mainstream poverty reduction efforts –
economic growth – continues in its current
guise to push us towards dangerous climate
change. Moreover, some forms of economic
growth can produce inequitable outcomes. And
yet there clearly are many ways to make the
energy that fuels growth much, much greener,
provided the right national energy investment
incentives can be put in place. Likewise, there
are a number of exciting examples – most
recently from a wave of Latin American
countries – which combine increases in
economic growth with reductions in inequities
in the distribution of national wealth (see also
the framing paper and section 5).
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“Deagrarinisation, urbanization,
migration and equity issues can all play
an important role in people’s ability to
either move out of poverty, or, on the
flip side, to entrench their positions of
marginalization and exclusion from
opportunities that may help to forge a
more resilient livelihood.”
Winkels 2011
1
2
“It is important that we do identify and
support initiatives where there are co-
benefits between poverty reduction and
climate change adaptation but not to
assume that all poverty-reducing
measures necessarily qualify as climate
change adaptation” 
Satterthwaite 2011
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Box 3: The framing paper’s six proposed principles for tackling
poverty in a changing climate
Make equality and low emissions a strong focus of economic growth.
Countries like Brazil and Mexico are working on reducing inequity, whilst countries like
the UK have very strict emissions targets. 
Manage structural changes to the ways people make a living to ensure better 
pro-poor outcomes 
The UNRISD (2010) argues the countries which most quickly reduced poverty in the
twentieth century have used industrial and agricultural policies fostering “employment-
centred” structural transformations.
Support and empower poor peoples’ own efforts at poverty reduction and adaptation to
climate change
Urban slum dwellers in India have started their own associations claiming rights and
services from the government (see Satterthwaite 2011)
Focus on building governance capacity in ways which recognise and support
autonomous change
Nepal’s Local Adaptation Plans of Action are designed to be simple, flexible, catalytic,
rooted, practical and meso-level focused (see Dixit’s support note for learning cycle one) 
Place more emphasis on pro-poor, inclusive social policy whilst working to ensure that
such policy is more explicitly serving low-carbon objectives
Efforts to ‘climate-proof’ social protection, and to see how it can contribute to
adaptation, are being researched by IDS (Davies et al., 2008) and the World Bank
(Heltberg et al., 2009). It is less clear that we have examples of social policy which also
serve mitigation purposes.
Consider wellbeing and alternative perspectives of poverty
Wellbeing can be addressed through measures which reduce poverty and have little or no
carbon footprint; such as making intra-national and intra-regional migration easier, or
extending the access of marginalised people to basic health services, or indeed to vote.
There is then, a need for more equitable forms
of economic growth and complementary
approaches to reducing poverty. If these can be
made to address the underlying causes which
keep many in poverty they are likely also to
reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts.
The common basis for all such approaches
should be a focus on the value of protective,
redistributive and transformative efforts to
reduce poverty. To this end, the framing paper
proposed six principles for tackling poverty in a
climate of change (see Box 3 above).
1
2
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Of the many reactions to the principles
proposed by the framing paper, two linked ones
stand out in particular. First, they do not deal
sufficiently with uncertainty. 
Second, and emerging from the focus on
uncertainty is the strong concern that many of
the principles and instruments discussed are not
new. By bringing existing development thinking
to climate change issues, the risk is that new
thinking for new problems will not emerge. 
Such reflections open up a core question,
common to many actors:
Does much of the work that donors and
development NGOs already do serve as good
climate change adaptation?
Or to put it another way:
If climate change really is a game-changer, 
do adaptation and mitigation actually require
changing the ‘rules of the game’? If so, 
which rules?
Differentiating between
good development 
and adaptation
3
13
Section digest...
Thinking about ‘what’s new’ in climate
change might easily lead to an over-focus
on the impacts. Any exploration of tackling
poverty in a changing climate should
emphasise the need to combine
approaches on dealing with vulnerability to
specific impacts with approaches to tackling
the underlying causes of vulnerability.
‘Good development’ – defined here as that
which addresses the root causes of
people’s vulnerability to enduring poverty
and powerlessness – can be an effective
adaptation strategy when it is poverty-
reducing, low-carbon and climate-resilient
Poverty is not a largely rural phenomenon. It
is as much about lack of entitlement and
visibility in informal urban settlements as it is
about natural resource access in rural areas.
Uncertainty relates to our
understanding of what and when
changes in climate will take place;
uncertainty in the models to assess
these changes; and uncertainty in our
understanding to assess the capacity
to cope with these changes due to
the multiple drivers of vulnerability
Hedger et al., 2011:35
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Box 4: Tipping points and non-linear change
Over the last couple of years, the science has started to suggest that it is very unlikely that we
will be able to keep global temperature rises below the ‘guardrail’ of 2ºC (Anderson and Bows,
2011), in order to avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. As a 4ºC rise in temperatures – by as early
as 2060 (Betts et al., 2011) – becomes more likely, there is a higher risk of reaching tipping
points in climate and large ecosystems. Once crossed, these could lead to non-linear climate
change that is not reversible within timescales relevant to human societies, and whose
consequences are much less predictable (New et al., 2011 , Richardson et al., 2009). Reaching
such tipping points would likely leave us confronting a range of climate-related impacts that
may be very damaging and for which there is little or no precedent in human history.
These considerations demonstrate how climate change poses new challenges which our
current development models will not necessarily help us to deal with.
See also section three in Bridging Paper one for a discussion on the challenges to planning for
climate change from both scientific uncertainty and from economic uncertainty around
decision-making for climate adaptation investment.
Development =
adaptation if... 
One of the motivations for this focus on ‘what’s
new’ about the climate change challenge is the
concern that current development (or
development thinking at least) is held to be
good enough for doing adaptation – we would
and sometimes do end up proposing the same
measures. There clearly are overlaps between
adaptation and development to the point that is
still difficult to define them separately. Many
development actors already have a lot to
contribute to poverty reduction in a changing
climate. However, if this assertion is left
unchallenged, there remains a risk that climate
change will be under-prioritised. So, how much
do we need to change? 
The first challenge is to define ‘good
development’ in order that it cannot be
confused with all current modes of and
approaches to development.
In the authors view, ‘good development’ is
defined as that which addresses the root causes
of people’s vulnerability to enduring poverty and
powerlessness. This it does as a foundation for
building resilience to the broader shocks and
stresses which intersect with and increase
vulnerability to climate change impacts in the
first place. 
There are, of course, new challenges from
climate change, not least in the speed and scale
at which impacts are to be felt – and these look
set only to increase as we continue to do so
little to reign in carbon emissions. But the roots
of existing vulnerability often have little to do
with climate change even though they will be
affected by its impacts (Eakin and Luers, 2006 ,
Ribot, 2009). 
“…concerns over people’s
vulnerability, equity, capacity and
emphasis on economic growth,
remain key in addressing well-known
(poverty, equity, welfare) as well as
less well defined (environmental
change, globalization, security) issues
in development.”
Winkels 2011
Even if our existing thinking on dealing with
underlying vulnerabilities has to be altered in
view of climate change implications, it has to
remain the starting point for our views on
adaptation. Thinking about what is new in
climate change can quite easily lead to a focus on
the impacts, and distract attention away from
underlying causes of vulnerability, if it is not
grounded in our existing thinking on root causes.
For this reason, any exploration of tackling
poverty in a changing climate should emphasise
the need to combine approaches on dealing
with vulnerability to specific impacts with
approaches to tackling the underlying causes of
vulnerability. Another way of putting it is, if root
causes of vulnerability are addressed, then
“adaptation represents a practical means of
achieving sustainable development in the longer
term” (Smit, 1993:1).
Whilst this emphasis on vulnerability-reducing
development has many supporters, there’s just
one problem: for hundreds of millions of
people, it’s not actually happening. Not only is it
not happening in less-developed countries
(LDCs) but, judging by recent work on the
global distribution of poverty, it’s not even
happening in many Middle-Income Countries
(MICs), like India. Andy Sumner recently
pointed to the ‘new bottom billion’ – the 960
million poor people, or 72% of the world's poor,
who live in the economically wealthier middle-
income countries, but still endure persistent
poverty, which increases their vulnerability to a
range of shocks and stresses (Sumner, 2011).
Satterthwaite (2011) argues that much of the
development that has happened in high-income
countries, in terms of the development of
infrastructure, the development of effective
governance institutions, and the diversification
of livelihoods away from agriculture, has
reduced vulnerability to climate impacts both
directly and indirectly. Therefore, putting in
place the broader institutions and
infrastructure that are part and parcel of ‘good’
development is a foundation to building
resilience to a wide range of shocks and
stresses. We need to do similar things today,
but where we need new thinking is on how to
do them in ways which respond to likely climate
impacts and to do them in ways which vastly
reduce carbon emissions. 
Putting the money
where the effort 
is needed
If we accept that development which builds
resilience more broadly will also contribute to
resilience to climate change impacts, one next
step could be to consider how to strike the right
balance in allocating climate change funding
between ‘broad’ resilience measures, and
climate-specific adaptation measures. One way of
thinking about this is captured in the ‘Balance of
Effort’ model in figure two, presented at the
learning event by Praveen Wignarajah. 
Tackling Poverty in a Changing Climate: Bridging Paper 2 2011
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Policies that support the entitlements,
systems and institutions that underpin
adaptive capacity, and that enhance
people’s ability to take autonomous
adaptive actions, are likely to have the
greatest positive impact on local
adaptation to climate change
Hedger et al 2011:35
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NOTE: This model posits how investment in climate change can be balanced between investing in
broader climate resilience (infrastructure, institutions, processes, etc.) and investing specifically in
additional adaptation activities (hard and soft). 
The model’s main hypothesis is that as overall levels of development and income rise, the share of
investment that should be directed at strengthening underlying resilience will decrease and a greater
percentage is directed at adapting the established infrastructure, institutions, processes, etc. to the
anticipated impacts of climate change. 
The examples of Ethiopia and the UK are given as points of comparison. According to this model, the
UK, with high existent levels of resilience to climate impacts, should focus 90% of its funding on
adaptation that is specific and additional. Ethiopia, with much lower levels of broad resilience, should
spend 90% of funding on these broad measures, and 10% on additional adaptation measures. 
NB: the figures of ‘90% funding towards resilience’ for Ethiopia, and ‘10% of funding toward resilience
in the UK’, are notional and for illustration only. 
Figure 2: ‘Balance of Effort’ Model
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Whilst this model provides a useful way of
thinking about a) what to take from current
development practice and what to add, and b)
how to prioritise funding, there are reasons for
using it with caution. First, the relationship
between resilience and adaptation must be
specified. The model seems to take adaptation
measures as incremental adjustments which
contribute to keeping the system in a resilient
state. But adaptation can also be – and might
also need to be – thought of in terms of
transformation of the system, not of maintaining
its resilience. An example would be switching
from farming to landscape tourism in a particular
area, to avoid depleting the water resources that
climate change (and other factors) may put at
risk (see also Nelson et al., 2007). 
Another potential issue is the assumption that
we can quantify the percentage of resilience to
climate impacts a country already has, which
would be a necessary precondition to
prioritising funding. This might run into the
same difficulties as have national indices of
vulnerability; namely that vulnerability can only
be measured by proxy, and choosing the right
proxy is ultimately subjective (see also Brooks et
al., 2005, Füssel, 2010, Vincent, 2006).
Moreover, quantifying resilience could duplicate
a key problem with quantifying vulnerability,
which is that there is an undue emphasis on
phenomena that are easily quantified, such as
biophysical impacts, and insufficient attention
paid to less tangible phenomena such as social
capital (Eakin and Luers, 2006).
Thus, whilst the difference between measures
that increase resilience and/or adaptation may
be somewhat fluid, such thinking advocates
adaptation that is rooted in reducing underlying
vulnerabilities and as such is a good way to
think about striking the resilience/adaptation
balance. In this regard, ‘good development’ as
an adaptation strategy might clearly be
distinguished from current development by
being a) poverty-reducing, b) low-carbon and 
c) climate-resilient.
Is the ‘green’ economy
a vision of ‘good’
development?
One emerging pathway for ‘good development’
as both adaptation and mitigation is through
supporting the ‘green economy’. A recent
United Nations report (UNEP, 2011) makes a
strident case that a green economy is not only
more environmentally sustainable than the
‘brown economy’ we have now, but can also pull
off the remarkable feat of reducing poverty
whilst keeping global warming below 2ºC by
2050. From this perspective, there is a need to
understand better the potentially strong
economic and employment advantages of the
green economy (see Box 5). 
“In [the city of ] London climate change
has been repackaged – adaptation as
resilience, security, green jobs and
economic competitiveness. If the
needed shift to ‘the green economy’
can be mapped out, shown to bring
strong economic and employment
advantages and policies identified that
actually make private investors invest
in the green economy, then low-carbon,
climate-resilient development may be
more feasible”
Satterthwaite 2011
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Impressive though the report is as a visioning
exercise to give some idea of what a green
economy might look like and for showing that
it is – in the abstract at least – quite feasible, it
is less instructive on how to get there.
Moreover, the report’s analysis of poverty and
equity is problematic, not least because it has a
very rural bias. A common recognition from
this learning cycle is that poverty is not a
largely rural phenomenon and is as much
about lack of entitlement and visibility in
informal urban settlements as it is to natural
resource access in rural areas. Likewise, a
focus on the root causes of vulnerability to
poverty and climate change impacts, in the
context of broader processes of autonomous
change, has profound implications for thinking
on a transition to a green economy, and who
would benefit or not. But such considerations
are absent from the report. 
Box 5: What would a green economy look like?
The report argues that a green economy: 
Recognizes the value of, and invests in, natural capital, because investment in forestry,
for instance makes economic sense and can support rural and agricultural livelihoods 
Is central to poverty alleviation. The report cites Pretty et al’s (2006) review of 286 ‘best
practice’ initiatives across 12.6 million farms in 57 developing countries, which found
that using resource-conserving practices increased yield whilst making critical
environmental services more available. The report also cites the Grameen Shakti
Programme in Bangladesh as an instance of the cost-effective role renewable energy can
play in poverty alleviation.
Creates jobs and enhances social equity, if policies are targeted at small and medium size
enterprises through green investment in agriculture, buildings, forestry, transport and
energy sectors 
Substitutes renewable energy and low-carbon technologies for fossil fuels, with
government playing a key role in the provision of incentives for investment in renewable
energy technologies. 
Promotes enhanced resource and energy efficiency, with a focus on the imperative of
decoupling growth absolutely from material and energy intensity.
Delivers more sustainable urban living and low-carbon mobility. The report cites
examples of green transport policies reducing emissions in London, Singapore, Lagos,
Ahmadabad, Guangzhou and Johannesburg.
Grows faster than a brown economy over time, while maintaining and restoring natural
capital, positing that a green investment scenario of 2% of GDP can deliver growth which
matches business as usual scenarios whilst mitigating climate change and avoiding the
loss of ecosystem services (ibid:6-23).
Source: (UNEP, 2011)
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Section digest...
Global climate change is usually framed
as a scientific problem which requires
changes to how we use energy and other
carbon-intensive resources. This has
implications for what kinds of
interventions do or do not receive
climate finance. Attention should also
focus on adaptation measures and
strategies and the many key linkages
these have with poverty reduction.
Situating sectoral approaches in a more
systematic perspective inevitably raises
the question of what is left out of the
‘system’, and whether this might not be
more important, when it comes to
tackling poverty in a changing climate,
than what it includes.
Whilst climate change does present new
challenges for development: power and
influence remain enduring
considerations. In relation to tackling
poverty there is a danger of specific
interests capturing the adaptation
agenda – to the detriment of poor people.
If tackling poverty in a changing climate requires
investment in systems which support poor
people to be resilient in the face of a range of
shocks and stresses – then the poverty agenda
needs a sharper focus in the global narratives
on climate change.
Representing poverty in
the broader climate
change arena
Both in the UK and internationally, climate
change is often framed as an environmental
problem which requires scientific and
technological intervention to bring emissions
under control. Whilst a science-technology
framing must certainly be part of the solution, it
has implications for what kinds of interventions
do or do not receive climate finance and may
also limit the scope for framing the problem in
terms of its poverty dimensions. A potential
concern here is that investment in clean
technologies, for instance, may be easier to ‘sell’
than other issues which are just as central both
to tackling poverty and reducing vulnerability to
climate change impacts. 
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It is important to take climate change beyond
environment ministries, and ensure that the
focus on mitigation, legitimate as it is, also
responds to poverty reduction imperatives.
Attention should also focus on adaptation
measures and strategies and the many key
linkages these have with poverty reduction.
An example of the relatively low profile of poverty
in the broad climate change debates was its lack
of prominence in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment
Report (2007). Although the Fifth Assessment,
currently underway, gives more prominence to
poverty, there remains scope to push poverty
further up the climate change agenda. 
Although low-carbon technologies have many
potential advantages for transforming the lives
of poor people, it is more than a case of
bringing a ‘pro-poor’ lens to questions of
energy provision. There is a need to make space
for issues which may yield big poverty reduction
dividends, even if they look somewhat ‘messy’,
i.e. governance or reducing social exclusion. For
example, investing in measures that facilitate
the kinds of migration which reduce poverty –
and which may become more necessary if
climate change undermines the viability of
agricultural livelihoods – may look a less
straightforward option for intervention than
investment into technological solutions. 
Whilst there is no clear relationship between
poverty and migration, there are instances
where migration has led to poverty-reducing
outcomes. Bangladesh has a long history of
high labour mobility, with relatively stable
migration owing to agricultural intensification,
diversification and urbanisation. These
migration patterns coincided with rapid poverty
declines, suggesting that the (capital-intensive)
development of agriculture, diversification and
lower poverty incidence limits the need to find
work elsewhere (de Haan, 2000). The UNDP
(2009) has released a report which considered
what migration-sensitive policies might look
like. Amongst a raft of proposals, they advocate
finding solutions that benefit both destination
communities and the migrants they receive; as
well as ensuring basic rights for migrants.
Migration is at once, then, a promising and a
messy phenomenon. If the broader framing of
responses to climate change remains centred
around energy and clean technology the
broader means of resilience building, poverty
reduction and ultimately adaptation may not be
given sufficient attention.
However, these points are relevant beyond the
provision of low-carbon technology. The
problem may be that “the international aid
(and climate finance) system is not well-
equipped to respond to such messiness, and
needs to develop new ways of working, and
take operational risks to do so effectively”
(Winthrop pers. Com, see also Box 7).
Centring the narrative
on reducing poverty
Whilst many development actors have made
significant progress in developing poverty-
centred adaptation narratives it is clear that
perhaps some of the dynamics of reducing
poverty in a changing climate are harder to turn
into quickly digestible storylines. This is in
sharp contrast, for instance, with investment in
low- or zero-carbon energy technology.
Compelling stories remain a central driver to
take key actors on the journey leading to low-
carbon, climate-resilient development with
poverty reduction at its heart. In this regard, the
‘poverty layer diagram’ (or the ‘onion’),
instigated by Su Lin Garbett-Shiels, emerged as
a useful tool for organising thinking on tackling
poverty in a changing climate (see figure three). 
At its centre figure three has poor people, their
voice and influence (or lack therein) and the
context affecting their poverty. Arranged
around the centre, in the second of the layers,
are the sectors through which governments
work and, subsequently donors, in efforts to
reduce poverty and build resilience. At the top
of the diagram is climate change, the
environmental impacts of which have
implications for each of the sectors.
Underneath are some of the intermediating
factors that affect concrete responses to
climate change impacts, such as policy
pressure, political economy, as well as forms of
and systems for disbursing climate finance.
With its multiple layers, the diagram is a useful
way of thinking through how to tackle poverty in
a changing climate for the following reasons: 
It brings together the sectoral
approaches (water, energy,
agriculture etc) into a more system-
oriented understanding of the
problem, showing visually that
climate change impacts across all of
these sectors. 
Understanding the impacts within
and across different sectors can help
actors prioritise interventions, partly
through seeing where the ‘gaps’ in
sectoral understanding or action
are, and what their implications are
for vulnerability to poverty and
climate change. 
It has a strong focus on the political
economy of climate finance which
will have critical implications for any
intervention which seeks to reduce
poverty and build resilience to
climate impacts (see Box 6 in
Bridging Paper One)
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Figure 3: Locating poverty at the heart of the climate
change response
1
2
3
POVERTY
(poor people)
POLICY PRESSURE
Climate finance Good development / stronginstitutions = resilience
Livestock
Fisheries
Income, assets,
entitlement,
access to services
VOICE AND INFLUENCE
Role of law Tenure
Education
Energy
Env. health
Agriculture
Land
Industry
Transport
Forestry
Water
CLIMATE CHANGE
Water/land
resource scarcity
New priority
areas?
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Vested interest
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
INCREASING (known and unknown)
Moreover, putting sectoral approaches in this
more systematic perspective inevitably raises
the question of what is left out of the ‘system’,
and whether this might not be more important,
when it comes to tackling poverty in a
changing climate, than what it includes. 
There is no straightforward way of deciding where
to delineate the ‘cut-off’ point of what to include
or not in the analysis of the system. Yet the ‘onion’
diagram can support a deeper interrogation of
what is and is not excluded, and stimulate
thinking on how to strike the balance between
sectoral focus and cross-sectoral coordination. 
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Box 6: Dealing with complexity: considering a 
systems perspective
Holistic perspectives have much to offer those dealing with climate change, and indeed are
necessary to capture the interlinked patterns of interactions between sectors and across
different scales. Action undertaken without regard for the consequences for the broader
‘system’, or without a longer-term vision beyond immediate vulnerability and resilience, can
prove short-sighted and counter-productive. Moreover, current systems perspectives take
human-environmental systems as their starting point. It is hard to envisage solutions to climate
change adaptation or mitigation or poverty reduction which fail to understand that elemental
set of inter-relationships. 
Whilst covering sectors, such as natural resources, is vital – not least because tipping points in
livelihood viability implies major sectoral change – promoting sectoral agendas runs the risk of
fostering a silo mentality to climate change, which is a fundamentally cross-cutting issue.
Systems analysis therefore has a lot to offer large organisations dealing with complex issues.
Yet there are tradeoffs and constraints that are likely to be faced by any organisation attempting
to embrace a systems perspective. Trying to keep all (or even just some) of a system in view
risks sacrificing focus and clarity precisely because of the greater levels of complexity involved.
Ultimately, even with systems thinking we end up drawing boundaries around what we focus on
because reality is too complex to take in all at once. As a result, the question of where such
boundaries are drawn can start to look as arbitrary as defining sectors. 
In many ways then, the diagram could be at the
centre of a strong, poverty-focussed climate
change narrative, as a way not just to explain
what tackling poverty in a changing climate will
involve, but also because it organises what
needs to be done around the core value of
putting poor people at the centre of the issues.
However, it should be recognised that it is
perhaps a deceptively simple way to bring
together a great many complex elements.
Getting joined-up thinking and action on
climate change across all of these sectors, and
gauging the collective impact of them on
poverty reduction and resilience building, is an
enormous undertaking. As Learning Cycle one
emphasised, it requires levels of coordination
and capacity to deal with complexity that,
perhaps, do not currently exist and may require
structures at the meso level for coordinating
action on critical issues.
“Coordination is necessary to avoid
duplication, reinventing the wheel
and for practices to be effective.
Catalysing real change requires
coordinated action at multiple
levels and in multiple sectors. This
is a multi-scale challenge”
Hedger et al 2011:35
Engaging with 
political economy 
Political economy perspectives feature
prominently in any discussion of climate
change. Whilst climate change does present
new challenges for development, power and
influence remain enduring considerations. In
relation to tackling poverty there is a danger of
specific interests capturing the adaptation
agenda – to the detriment of poor people.
Agriculture for example is now a key component
to be funded by climate finance, but is by no
means automatically pro-poor; poorer farmers
have been pushed off land by members of the
agri-business sector which, at the same time, is
often positioning itself to receive climate
finance. The same is true for forest protection
and afforestation. Moreover, much climate
finance may be channelled through relatively
weak environment ministries with little or no
expertise or capacity in poverty reduction.
In addition finance is sometimes channelled
into infrastructure projects which are not
thought through with low-carbon or climate
impact criteria taken into account. The risk is,
then, of contributing to locking countries into
carbon-intensive development pathways which
would be expensive and inefficient to retro-fit. 
The challenge is twofold: 
to address the mismatch between the
national and international levels in which
many of the climate finance decisions are
taken, and 
to get finance to the local level 
to support processes from which poor
people could benefit more directly and
influence the decision-making process.
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How, for example, do we
comprehensively address the social
dimensions of climate change without
thinking through the different ways in
which social policy is viewed and
implemented in the various ministries?
Winkels 2011
1
2
Box 7: Approaches to making climate finance pro-poor
Delivering for the poor in a changing climate is chaotic, complex and messy; it requires
responses which are mutually supporting across scales. Stories from programmes which build
collective capacity for grassroots action should directly inform policy to strengthen the support
and commitment to pro-poor climate finance. 
There are examples of funds made directly available and accountable to citizens, such as slum
dwellers (see http://www.sdinet.org/upfi/ or http://www.achr.net/) and forest groups from
which learning can be generated.
However it is unlikely that donors will be able to reach the poorest every time. Learning from
challenges and successes in existing programmes is key to understanding how to increase
donor engagement with those most vulnerable to climate change impacts and to improving the
accountability of funds. Programmes such as the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience have
much to learn from on both accounts. 
See for example the Mozambique study from Shankland and Chambote, 2011, in the IDS
bulletin on the political economy of climate change.
The learning hub process recognised that much
of what is known about tackling poverty and
addressing the root causes of vulnerability is
still relevant in the context of a changing
climate. There is an additional need to respond
to specific climate impacts through planned
adaptation interventions. Yet tackling poverty in
a changing climate is dependent on having the
building blocks in place. It also requires using 
strategies which strike the right balance between
building the resilience and adaptive capacity of
poor people to a range of shocks and stresses.
Placing an increased emphasis on the scale and
exponential character of the problem (see box
four) is needed to generate the political will for:
building resilience in existing sectors, and; 
for developing new planned programmes
that respond directly to projected climate
shocks and stresses in neglected areas,
such as natural resource management. 
The key challenges of weak governance and
institutions will be further explored in learning
cycle four – difficult environments.
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Learning lessons for
tackling poverty in a
changing climate
5
Significant links between ‘approaches to planning for climate change’ (learning
cycle 1) and ‘tackling poverty in a changing climate’ (learning cycle 2)
n the central necessity of engaging with and understanding the political economy of climate
change finance, low carbon and adaptation
n the core challenge of dealing with uncertainty
n the notion that building resilience is a core foundation for developing adaptive capacity
n the challenge of increasing governance capacity for coordination and cross-scalar working. 
These central challenges will be built upon in the forthcoming cycles.
“...because there are no clear dividing
lines between what is new and additional
over development effort ...working at the
local level and supporting autonomous
efforts can be more clear-cut”
Hedger et al 2011:30
1
2
1. Be pro-active in ensuring that poverty
issues are centre-stage in the global
climate change debates
Both in the UK and internationally, climate
change is often framed as an environmental
problem requiring scientific and technological
intervention, in order to bring emissions under
control. Whilst this framing must certainly be
part of the solution, the discussion noted that it
might limit the scope for framing the problem
also in terms of its poverty dimensions. It is
important to take climate change beyond the
environment ministries, and ensure that the
focus on mitigation, legitimate as it is, also
responds to poverty reduction imperatives (an
issue developed further in learning cycle 3).
Rather, attention should focus on adaptation
measures and strategies and the many key
linkages these have with poverty reduction. 
2. Build resilience in developing
countries (not carbon-intensive
development)
In order for poor people to be resilient in the
face of climate change impacts they need
infrastructure, services and local governance
processes that prevent natural hazards from
becoming disasters; access to adequately-paid,
climate-insensitive or resilient employment
opportunities; institutions that respond quickly
in emergencies, and so on.
These things are taken for granted in higher-
income areas and societies that have already
made the necessary investments. On the
surface, this can be taken as an argument that
development, as high-income countries have
known it, is a good model for resilience. But
making development low-carbon, whilst
responding to the causes of poverty in differing
developing countries, requires fundamentally
different ways of achieving these objectives.
Partly it requires energy and productive
infrastructure to be much lower-carbon than
those found in high-income countries, but it
also means rethinking what it is that developing
countries aspire to – especially to the extent that
this entails consumption-fuelled growth.
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Ten critical dimensions of tackling poverty in a
changing climate
Much more attention needs to be
given to critical sectors such as
water, food and human health, more
attention also need to be paid to the
basic energy, transport and
communication systems that enable
higher level systems to function and,
in doing so, contribute to adaptive
capacity
Hedger et al 2011:27
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3. Explore how to square the
relationship between poverty 
reduction, a low-carbon future and
economic growth
Perhaps one of the most fundamental reasons
why governments the world over put economic
growth at the centre of policy objectives is that
no-one has come up with a viable, accepted
alternative. Neither DFID nor any other donor
agency can be expected to settle what is surely
one of the biggest questions of our time. But
DFID can position itself to ensure that pro-
poor perspectives and solutions are centrally
voiced in the debate, however it is resolved. 
It has been argued – and on the basis of
extensive historical evidence – that economic
growth reduces poverty (Dollar and Kraay,
2002). But what kinds of growth do this best
and under what circumstances? Global
economic growth has been accompanied by
greater inequity in income distribution for five
centuries now (see Basu, 2006). This suggests
that driving down inequity whilst maintaining
economic growth is not going to be easy. Nor,
clearly, do we have a resounding track record in
this area. Yet there is evidence from the
countries that have, against this global trend,
managed to reduce income inequality on the
back of economic growth, and there is analysis
of the measures that appear to work best (see
Cornia, 2010). 
Even if we do this, we still have to make such
growth low-carbon. And even if we do that, we
must still bear in mind that the new impetus for
making growth low-carbon is not automatically
going to be pro-poor. It should take into
account questions of equity and leave sufficient
space for both material and non-material
aspects of wellbeing. These thoughts could
fruitfully be a central plank in our thinking on
what low-carbon development is or should be. 
4. Strengthen governance for reducing
poverty and vulnerability to climate
change impacts
Poverty reduction in a changing climate makes
the challenge of strengthening national and
local governance all the more urgent, even as it
raises questions about whether current
governance arrangements will fit the bill. Good
national and local governance is prerequisite for
building the resilience in developing countries,
as discussed above, and a major part of this is
capacity to make the necessary changes. 
For instance, given urban population trends
and the tendencies for residents of informal
settlement to be more vulnerable to climate
impacts, the capacity of local government to
provide basic infrastructure is going to be
central to adaptation strategies. Better
relationships with local government can
enable community organizations to undertake
locally appropriate measures to reduce poverty
and climate change risk (e.g. small-scale
drainage, community disaster evacuation
routes). Before any of this can happen,
though, these residents have to be ‘visible’
and entitled to access the provision of
government services which contribute to
building resilience (Satterthwaite, 2011).
Many countries with significant
adaptation deficits require both a
national policy framework to mobilise
resources, and high resolution local
plans to target those resources into
the hands of those who need them
Hedger et al 2011:34
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5. Engage with the private sector 
The state cannot do everything, which means
that our focus should also look to ‘unusual
suspects’. The private sector does not always
have the greenest of images when it comes to
climate change. The reason for this is that the
private sector is a central part of a global
economic system which, to this day, continues to
drive up the greenhouse gas emissions that are
at the heart of the climate change problem. To be
fair, though, so are we all, and there are many
within the private sector who feel as frustrated by
the lack of an international political regime for
action as do environmental campaigners.
Therefore, the ways in which private sector
actors are brought into efforts to tackle poverty
in a changing climate are critical because: 
The private sector can be a source of
climate change and poverty solutions, i.e.
providing the technology and investment
for green energy, as well as green economy
employment opportunities which reduce
poverty. This could be happening a lot
faster if, for instance, there were more
secure regulatory environments which
gave the energy sector the incentives and
security to invest long-term in renewable
technologies. 
We are already, whether we like it or not, in
an era of decreasing state power and
responsibility, and a correspondingly
greater emphasis on market mechanisms.
Rather than trying to reinvent the global
economic order, it may be more productive
to try to make it work better in terms of
reducing poverty and carbon emissions. In
development terms, this involves reaching
out to the private sector as well as falling
back on more established development
sector actors such as civil society. 
It is crucial to remember that many poor
people work in or otherwise comprise the
‘private sector’ (although this does not
necessarily hold for the poorest, who are
frequently poor owing to their exclusion
from labour markets). There is a sense,
then, that some of the alliances we may
seek to build with the private sector are
intrinsically pro-poor. 
6. Link the ‘bigger picture’ with the 
local level
The ‘meta-level issues’, that is the bigger
climate change picture, are not well-linked to a
poverty agenda (hence the importance of the
first dimension discussed above). Three points
can be made here:
The potentially adverse consequences at
the local level of focussing on the global
level. For example, the international interest
in African land as a means to grow export
crops and biofuels has led to restrictions
on the land access of pastoralists and also
evictions of small-scale cultivators in
Kenya’s Tana River Delta (Abdirizak, 2011) 
Conversely, action at the local level is not
enough to deal with the underlying causes
of vulnerability poor people frequently face,
which are embedded in broader societal,
economic or political dynamics at national
and global levels. Therefore, the ways in
which we link-up between levels on a scale
and across different scales are crucial to the
effectiveness of our efforts to reduce poverty
and vulnerability to climate change impacts. 
The need to confront the political economy
of global, national and local interests, which
clearly do not always coincide. This requires
an awareness of the politics, interests and
narratives which drive policy processes, so
that spaces for influencing on behalf of poor
people can be identified or created. 
One factor affecting all of the above issues
relates to how we negotiate the complexities of
cross-scale and cross-level interactions. Climate
change is a global challenge and demands
effective interactions between various actors
and institutions at different levels within and
across different scales (geographical, temporal,
jurisdictional etc). 
Much autonomous adaptation occurs
in the informal sector and, though
visible and available at the household
level, it is invisible at the national and
international levels of planning
Hedger et al., 2011:25
a
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7. Ask how poor people are empowered
by efforts to tackle poverty in a 
changing climate
It is imperative to ensure that poor people’s
own perspectives and capacities directly
impinge upon efforts to tackle poverty in a
changing climate. It is one way of ensuring that
heterogeneous groups of people affected
differently by climate change are not aggregated
into a uniform category of ‘the poor’. It is an
important way of recognising and using the
adaptive capacities many people already have,
and thereby facilitating autonomous change
(see below). It is also a way to address
concerns around the connection between the
local level and the ‘bigger picture’. One
concrete suggestion for including poor voices is
to ensure that some of the international climate
finance available finds its way to groups
founded and run by poor people themselves
(see box seven). This would also provide an
opportunity for co-constructing knowledge for
tackling poverty in a changing climate.
8. Embrace autonomous change
How do we deal with climate change in view of
the ways that the rapid growths of informal
settlements – often driven by access to labour
markets – affect the vulnerability of large parts
of the population? How do we get migration
outcomes that reduce poverty and vulnerability
to climate change? How do we facilitate
livelihoods diversification which reduces
poverty whilst being low carbon? 
Engaging with autonomous change is partly
about recognising the positive aspects of what
people are already doing and supporting it. But
some forms of autonomous change can
undermine the viability of livelihood strategies
people rely upon. Support can be offered here
by either helping people find ways to hold onto
an existing livelihood strategy (for instance
through social protection activities which help
people to maintain productive assets), or
helping people get more from a big change to
the way they make a living. An example might
be to fund initiatives that support the rights of
migrants into urban centres to access local
services, or increase their access to urban
labour markets by helping them afford or
access public transport.
9. Strike the balance between sector 
and system 
Promoting sectoral agendas runs the risk of
fostering a silo mentality to climate change,
which is a fundamentally cross-cutting issue.
But covering sectors such as natural resources
– which arguably do not receive sufficient
attention – is vital, not least because tipping
points in livelihood viability implies major
sectoral change. At the same time, holistic
perspectives have much to offer and are
necessary to capture the implications of
interactions between sectors and across
different scales. Action undertaken without
regard for the consequences for the broader
‘system’, or without a longer-term vision, can
prove short-sighted and counter-productive.
Moreover, current systems perspectives take
human-environmental systems as their
starting point. 
It is hard to envisage solutions to climate
change adaptation or mitigation or poverty
reduction which fail to understand that
elemental set of inter-relationships. Yet trying
to keep all (or even just some) of a system in
view risks sacrificing focus and clarity precisely
because of the greater levels of complexity
involved. This is an essential tension which
needs to be managed carefully. 
Planning involves strengthening the
vibrant role of the informal sector
upon which the poor depend,
including supporting the more
dynamic service and job provision
functions
Hedger et al., 2011:34
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10. Construct a strong, persuasive
narrative on climate change adaptation to
push internally and externally
Partly because adaptation can be so difficult to
distinguish from development (see section
three), and partly because technological
solutions to climate change problems are so
seductive, getting a strong and clear storyline on
adaptation is a challenge. Yet building a
coherent narrative around pro-poor, climate
resilient and low carbon development will help
to deliver positive change. A key part of this
exercise is being aware of the range of
competing/complementary narratives, actors
and interests to be negotiated.
In this regard, poverty focussed agencies might
seek to build a strong narrative around the
following ideas which came out strongly in this
Learning cycle: 
1. Addressing the underlying causes of
vulnerability as a means of reducing
poverty and the harmful effects of
climate change impacts
2. Using a systems perspective to
coordinate and guide sectoral efforts
to tackle poverty in a changing
climate 
3. Balancing efforts between broad-
based resilience building and
climate-specific interventions. 
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